Alberto Andreu Marín, Fernando Javier Martínez Santiago, Luís Alfonso Ureña López y Pilar López Úbeda Sistemas Inteligentes de Acceso a … Read More →.

Canguilhem’s take on the normal and the pathological offers an interesting insight to elaborate on a phenomenological account of illness and the medical encounter within the scope of Heidegger’s Daseinanalysis from Being and Time. Fredrik Svenaeus has drawn from the latter a definition of illness as an “unhomelike being in the world”. In this paper, I will elaborate on these concepts through the tale of Adriana, a cancer fighter that got diagnosed at age 26. Through her story, I will try (...) to illustrate Canguilhem’s main criticism against medicine's current state, as well as describe phenomenologically what it means to be ill, and what illness does to the patient's being-in-the-world. (shrink)

This paper traces the ancestry of a familiar historiographical narrative, according to which early modern philosophy was marked by the development of empiricism, rationalism, and their synthesis by Immanuel Kant. It is often claimed that this narrative became standard in the nineteenth century, due to the influence of Thomas Reid, Kant and his disciples, or German Hegelians and British Idealists. The paper argues that the narrative became standard only at the turn of the twentieth century. This was not due to (...) the influence of Reid, German Hegelians, or British Idealists as they did not endorse the narrative, although Thomas Hill Green may have facilitated its uptake. The narrative is based on Kant’s historiographical sketches, as corrected and integrated by Karl Leonhard Reinhold. It was first fleshed out into full-fledged histories by two Kantians, Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann and Johann Gottlieb Buhle. Numerous historians, several of whom were not Kantians, spread it in the English-speaking world. They include Kuno Fischer, Friedrich Ueberweg, Richard Falckenberg, and Wilhelm Windelband. However, the wide availability of their works did not suffice to make the narrative standard because, until the 1890s, the Hegelian account was at least as popular as theirs. Among the factors that allowed the narrative to become standard are its aptness to be adopted by philosophers of the most diverse persuasions, its simplicity and suitability for teaching. (shrink)

Insofar as the so-called new theory of reference has come to be acknowleged as the leading theoretical paradigm in semantic research, it has been widely accepted that proper names directly refer to their designation. In advancing some of the most convincing arguments in favour of this view of names, S. Kripke has however left somehow undecided what the role of context is in determining which is the direct referent for a name. According to one interpretation of his thought, context has (...) only an external task in allowing one to simultaneously select a name and a given referent for it. Although this interpretation is the most faithful to Kripke's own intentions, there is another possible interpretation of what he says, according to which context more significantly permits one to determine a given referent at a time for one and the same name1. This different interpretation of the role of context is not marginal for the purpose of semantics, since it generates two distinct theoretical conceptions of what a proper name is. According to the former, the 'idiosyncratic' conception, proper names are individuated (at least) by their form and bearer. According to the latter, the 'linguistic' conception, they are individuated by their morphology only: i.e., by their being (syntactically) unstructured strings of letters. The two conceptions prove to be substantially different when homonyms are called into play. Insofar as both the Greek philosopher and the famous shipowner are called "Aristotle", we have two distinct, albeit homonymous, names for the idiosyncratic conception but only one name (as applied to two distinct individuals) for the linguistic conception2. In what follows, I will first sketch one of the most recent attempts to support for the idiosyncratic view, namely the one which traces back to Kaplan [1990] theory of words, and recall its merits over its cognate idiosyncratic theories. I will then try to give an argument in favour of the linguistic conception, by pointing out how the latter.... (shrink)

This article builds on the hypothesis that theoretical approaches to philosophy of technology are currently stuck in a false alternative: either embrace the “empirical turn” or jump back into the determinism, pessimism, and general ignorance towards specific technologies that characterized the “humanities philosophy of technology.” A third path is however possible, which consists of articulating an empirical point of view with an interest in the symbolic dimension in which technologies and technological mediations are always already embedded. Bourdieu’s sociology of the (...) symbolic forms represents an important and mostly unexplored resource in this respect. In this article, we introduce the notion of technological capital and its tree states—objectified, institutionalized, and embodied. In the first section, we briefly account of the empirical turn in philosophy of technology. Specific attention is then devoted to postphenomenology. We depict three perspectives in postphenomenology: standard postphenomenology, in which one single human-technology-world relation at a time is considered; the attempt of some technological mediation theorists to articulate postphenomenology and actor-network theory ; the original effort in Ihde, which is currently practiced by a minority of postphenomenologists, to combine an interest for the empirical dimension of technological mediations with an attention to the social and cultural conditions of possibility in which these mediations are embedded. In the second section, we consider some recent critiques of the limits of the empirical turn in philosophy of technology, especially related to postphenomenology. Furthermore, we argue that Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology may benefit the philosophy of technology. One might say that according to a Bourdieusian perspective, technologies are, in their invention, implementation, and use, embedded in symbolically organized interactions among social actors or groups. The notion of technological capital is introduced. A specific attention is given to its embodied state, which is related to the habitus. Such concept suggests that, to rephrase the famous sentence by Heidegger, “the essence of technology is not totally technological.” In the conclusion, we consider three risks related to a Bourdieusian approach to technology: transparency, determinism, and absolutism. (shrink)

Reliance on intuitive and emotive responses is widespread across many areas of bioethics, and the current debate on biotechnological human enhancement is particularly interesting in this respect. A strand of “bioconservatives” that has explicitly drawn connections to the modern conservative tradition, dating back to Edmund Burke, appeals explicitly to the alleged wisdom of our intuitions and emotions to ground opposition to some biotechnologies or their uses. So-called bioliberals, those who in principle do not oppose human bioenhancement, tend to rely on (...) rational arguments and to see intuitions and emotions mostly as sources of biases. This approach often translates into shifting the burden of proof onto bioconservatives and challenging them to provide arguments against the proposed enhancement to back what bioliberals perceive as merely intuitive, emotive, and irrational reactions. -/- In this article, I am going to show that the methodological divide between bioliberals and bioconservatives is less significant than at first glance it appears to be and less significant than it is often taken to be. I will do so by defending two theses. The first is that reliance on intuitions and emotions is not a prerogative of bioconservatives: bioliberals have their typical intuitions and emotive responses and are for this reason exposed to potential biases in the same way as bioconservatives are. The second thesis is that reliance on intuitions and emotions is not necessarily antithetic to reason and rationality. This latter thesis has been philosophically defended with particular reference to the debate on biotechnologies, while the former is perhaps more controversial and more difficult to accept—at least for bioliberals. In both cases, I will support the claims by drawing on resources from the field of moral psychology and the sciences of the mind and, particularly, by applying to some positions in the enhancement debate recent findings about the role of intuitions and emotions in human moral assessment. This new empirically informed perspective holds promises for solving the methodological controversy between bioconservatives and bioliberals, thus enabling proper dialogue and debate between the two sides. (shrink)

In 1930, the Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno (1864–1936) wrote one of his most well-known novels, San Manuel Bueno, mártir [Saint Manuel Bueno, Martyr]. The novel is about the fictional character Manuel Bueno, a catholic priest from a small Spanish village who, despite being unable to believe the Christian claim that there is an after earthly death life, devotes himself to the spiritual care of his people, being thereby sanctified after his death. The aim of this paper is to show (...) that the guideline of San Manuel Bueno, mártir is the expression, in fictional, non-philosophical language, of the conception of religious faith Unamuno had already defended in his major philosophical work, Del sentimiento trágico de la vida en los hombres y los pueblos [The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Nations]. (shrink)

En 1976, mientras Milton Friedman recoge el Premio Nobel de Economía por sus logros en los campos del análisis del consumo y la teoría monetaria, el punk expande su mensaje de disonancia empujando los límites de lo decible hacia espacios hasta entonces poco conocidos. En ese mismo momento bandas como Iron Maiden comienzan a generar imaginarios extraños que canalizan algunas tendencias sociales; las pistas de baile exploran nuevas formas de relación cultural, y el espíritu nihilista de Iggy Pop flota en (...) el ambiente. La década de 1970 es la década del extrañamiento, en la que el sueño económico de la posguerra se deshace provocando la aparición en el horizonte de una “nueva” forma de revisar la construcción de la vida cotidiana: el neoliberalismo. En paralelo a este proceso, y en dirección opuesta, existe una búsqueda de respuestas a nivel cultural. Respuestas que no pretenden salvar nada, sino ahondar en la miseria de ese mismo tiempo. Ahí aparecen el punk y otros movimientos que pronto son devorados por el mercado. Pero ¿desde dónde se nos ha contado esta historia de derrotas? ¿Hemos aceptado que la historia de nuestras derrotas culturales sea narrada por la maquinaria neoliberal? Quizá debamos plantarnos y pensar otras formas de narrar una década, la de los setenta, en cuya estela seguimos. Este libro es un intento radical y novedoso de explorar este periodo donde cultura y política se cruzan a través de la música"--Publisher's description. (shrink)

In his highly regarded history of the rise of clinical trials in America, HarryMarks describes how their widespread adoption resulted largely fromthe efforts of ‘therapeutic reformers’ who sought to replace the individualexpertise of clinicians with the ‘science of controlled experiment’. Thetransition described by Marks resembles in many respects the transition fromthe ‘truth-to-nature’ objectivity of individual experts to a ‘mechanical’ formof objectivity portrayed by Daston and Galison. In particular,Marks details the passage from a regime of trust in expertise and experts to (...) aregime based on the mechanical generation of data, the elimination ofhuman judgement and the adoption of a ‘view from nowhere’ where individual and group idiosyncrasies are systematically suppressedthrough recourse to quantitative methods.[...]. (shrink)

August Weismann proposed that genetic changes in somatic cells cannot pass to germ cells and hence to next generations. Nevertheless, evidence is accumulating that some environmental effects can promote heritable changes in the DNA of germ cells, which implies that some somatic influence on germ line is possible. This influence is mostly detrimental and related to the presence of oxidative stress, which induces mutations and epigenetic changes. This effect should be stronger in males due to the particular characteristics of sperm. (...) Here, we propose the hypothesis that females are able to avoid males with oxidatively damaged DNA in the germ line by using oxidative‐dependent (pre‐ and post‐mating) signals. This new hypothesis may shed light on unsolved questions in evolutionary biology, such as the benefits of polyandry, the lek paradox, or the role of sexual selection on the evolution of aging. BioEssays 30:1212–1219, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

_An eclectic history of human curiosity, a great feast of ideas, and a memoir of a reading life from an internationally celebrated reader and thinker_ Curiosity has been seen through the ages as the impulse that drives our knowledge forward and the temptation that leads us toward dangerous and forbidden waters. The question “Why?” has appeared under a multiplicity of guises and in vastly different contexts throughout the chapters of human history. Why does evil exist? What is beauty? How does (...) language inform us? What defines our identity? What is our responsibility to the world? In Alberto Manguel’s most personal book to date, the author tracks his own life of curiosity through the reading that has mapped his way. Manguel chooses as his guides a selection of writers who sparked his imagination. He dedicates each chapter to a single thinker, scientist, artist, or other figure who demonstrated in a fresh way how to ask “Why?” Leading us through a full gallery of inquisitives, among them Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Lewis Carroll, Rachel Carson, Socrates, and, most importantly, Dante, Manguel affirms how deeply connected our curiosity is to the readings that most astonish us, and how essential to the soaring of our own imaginations. (shrink)

We investigate the uniform computational content of the open and clopen Ramsey theorems in the Weihrauch lattice. While they are known to be equivalent to $\mathrm {ATR_0}$ from the point of view of reverse mathematics, there is not a canonical way to phrase them as multivalued functions. We identify eight different multivalued functions and study their degree from the point of view of Weihrauch, strong Weihrauch, and arithmetic Weihrauch reducibility. In particular one of our functions turns out to be strictly (...) stronger than any previously studied multivalued functions arising from statements around $\mathrm {ATR}_0$. (shrink)

All over Europe, the provision of healthcare services is widely considered a primary duty of the government. Universal access to medical care can be considered a basic ingredient of the so-called “European social model.” But if universal access to medical care is seldom questioned, European governments—faced with expanding costs caused by an increasing demand driven by an aging population and technology-driven improvements—are contemplating the possibility of “rationing”1 treatments, or the possibility of allowing a greater role for private suppliers. If a (...) “multi-tier” healthcare system has long been anathema to the European leadership, guaranteeing a uniform access to state-of-the-art care seems to be well beyond the means of states suffering from persisting debt crisis. Was the failure of state-controlled “adequate” healthcare totally unpredictable? Far-sighted criticisms had been offered by two eminent thinkers in the classical liberal tradition, Herbert Spencer and Friedrich A. von Hayek . Neither author is usually recognized as a forerunner of contemporary critics of the welfare state, and both investigated the issue of the state financing and providing health services well before or right after the establishment of national health services. With the benefit of hindsight, reading Spencer and Hayek helps us to understand how the crisis of state-supplied healthcare is not rooted in the mere progress of clinical technology, but is rather the logical consequence of the theoretical basis of the model itself. Whereas modern theorists of the welfare state tend to offer theories that are impervious to a critical appraisal of their unintended consequences—insofar as they are framed in a language of “rights”—both Hayek and Spencer understood that human systems are complex, and that unwanted effects of public policy should be taken into account. Although Spencer emphasized the moral hazards accruing from the paternalism involved in governmental provision of health services, Hayek explained how modern healthcare systems differ from real, private insurance designed to offer proper coverage against risks. These authors appreciated that the politicization of healthcare was bound to result in both standardization of care and disregard for the responsibility that comes with personal freedom. These two “diagnoses before the illness” can help us in defining the challenges and the potential solutions that healthcare systems face today. Understanding the fatal conceits inherent in the very architecture of national health services can be the first step toward healing our healthcare systems. (shrink)

The internet changes our ways of both knowing and thinking. A person who has grown up using the internet, whether for school or simply to play videogames, tends to extend and reproduce the same model of knowing in other instances. The internet replaces a linear and centralized model with a circular and diffused framework for self-learning that presents certain familiar limits: it demands speed or, at least, not pausing. The internet user is omnivorous, in a rush, and develops a memory (...) that is limited to the short term. However, there are some positive aspects of circular learning that should be emphasized: the possibility of constructing personal paths, comparing different opinions, innovating, overcoming old disciplinary divisions, surmounting the drawbacks of linear learning that often lead to uncritical and purely molecular thinking. La Rete modifica sia il modo di conoscere che di pensare. Una mente cresciuta sulla Rete, facendo ricerche per la scuola, o semplicemente giocando, tende a riprodurre anche in altre occasioni lo stesso modello di conoscenza. A un modello lineare la Rete sostituisce un modello circolare e diffuso di autoapprendimento che presenta alcuni noti limiti: richiede di correre, o per lo meno richiede di non fermarsi. L’utente della Rete è onnivoro e ha fretta e matura una memoria chiusa nel breve termine. Ci sono tuttavia aspetti positivi dell'apprendimento circolare che vanno sottolineati: la possibilità di costruirsi propri percorsi, sondare diverse opinioni, innovare, superare vecchie partizioni disciplinari, superando i difetti dell'apprendimento lineare che molto spesso induce a un pensiero acritico e premente molecolare. (shrink)

La democracia hizo que los sentados a la mesa fuésemos más. Que pudiéramos tener mejores productos y más cocineros. Que el sabor no tuviese que pedir permiso para poder viajar. Que los aromas no fuesen detenidos por alcabalas ni en aduanas. Con la libertad se come mejor. La posibilidad de escoger se agranda hasta volverse casi infinita. La presencia de la democracia, y también su ausencia y restricciones, se observan no sólo en la calle y en la prensa sino también (...) y mejor en la mesa cotidiana. La libertad se olfatea, se bebe y se mastica. La democracia en la mesa tiene también su precio. Los malos, el engaño y la especulación forman parte del proceso. Saber escoger implica saber vivir. Table and FreedomDemocracy increased the number of those sitting at the table. It made possible for us to have better products and more cooks; for flavor not to ask for permission to be able to travel around; for aromas not to be detained by checkpoints or customs. With freedom one eats better. The possibility to choose grows larger, ultimately becoming almost infinite. The presence of democracy, and also its absence and restrictions, can be noticed not also in the street and the press, but also, and in a better fashion, at the ordinary table. Freedom can be smelled, drunk and chewed. Democracy at the table also has its price. The delinquents, deceit and speculation are part of the process. The art of choosing entails knowing the art of living. (shrink)

Sociological approaches to inquiry on emotion in educational settings are growing. Despite a long tradition of research and theory in disciplines such as psychology and sociology, the methods and approaches for naturalistic investigation of emotion are in a developmental phase in educational settings. In this article, recent empirical studies on emotion in educational contexts are canvassed. The discussion focuses on the use of multiple methods within research conducted in high school and university classrooms highlighting recent methodological progress. The methods discussed (...) include facial expression analysis, verbal and nonverbal conduct, and self-report methods. Analyses drawn from different studies, informed by perspectives from microsociology, highlight the strengths and limitations of any one method. The power and limitations of multimethod approaches is discussed. (shrink)

In recent works, Chomsky has once more endorsed a computational view of rulefollowing, whereby to follow a rule is to operate certain computations on a subject’s mental representations. As is well known, this picture does not conform to what we may call the grammatical conception of rule-following outlined by Wittgenstein, whereby an elucidation of the concept of rule-following is aimed at by isolating grammatical statements regarding the phrase ‘to follow a rule’. As a result, Chomskyan and Wittgensteinian treatments of topics (...) immediately connected with rule-following, namely linguistic competence and understanding, are utterly different from one another. There are two possible stances that computationalists like Chomsky may adopt with regard to the discrepancy between the two aforementioned modes of dealing with rule-following, namely a conciliatory and a non-conciliatory attitude. According to the former attitude, grammatical remarks on and computationallyoriented theories of rule-following investigate one and the same topic although admittedly at different levels, namely a conceptual and an empirical one. According to the latter attitude, grammatical remarks are just a preliminary step in the investigation of rule-following which scientific advancement, presently represented by computationally-oriented theories on this matter, is well entitled to put aside. In what follows, however, I will try to show that both stances are problematic. The conciliatory attitude simply does not work, for it hardly copes with the fact that the concept of rule-following does not supervene, even weakly, on the property of rule-following, namely the property instantiated in the mental/cerebral phenomena that computationally-oriented theories of rule-following study. To take the contrary attitude, on the other hand, is to end up with another disappointing result, namely that the computational treatment of rule-following ultimately deals with something different from that which we wished to gain knowledge of when we began our inquiry into rule-following.. (shrink)

Da Hegel fino a Bradley, l'attacco idealista ad una concezione pluralistica della realtà come una credenza non suffragata dalla verità delle cose si è valso dell'argomento semantico secondo il quale le espressioni indicali, su cui da ultimo riposerebbe tutta la valenza referenziale del linguaggio, non si riferiscono a segmenti discreti del reale ma si limitano ad esprimere universali. Dal versante ontologico opposto, Russell ha guidato la reazione all'idealismo assoluto (inaugurando così uno dei filoni di riflessione della filosofia analitica) facendo perno (...) proprio sulla capacità da parte di tali espressioni di designare direttamente atomi distinti di realtà. L'argomento idealista, nelle sue linee generali, funziona così. Anche ammesso che un termine singolare "N" non possa denotare un'entità reale finché non è disambiguato da un completamento indicale (del tipo "questo N"), un'operazione del genere è inutile perché un'espressione indicale è a sua volta incapace di designare univocamente un individuo. Quando uso "questo", ad es., un tale uso non designa alcunché perché ogni cosa è un questo e il questo in sé stesso non è alcun individuo. Quello che faccio in tale uso è piuttosto dare luogo all'espressione di un universale, nella fattispecie del concetto (individuale) di questità. L'argomento idealista è fallace. Ma la replica russelliana, che pure ha dalla sua tutta la forza del senso comune, non è in grado di metterlo fuori gioco integralmente. Infatti, entrambi assumono - l'uno come premessa all'interno di un ragionamento ad absurdum, l'altro come tesi positiva - che riferirsi mediante un indicale ad un individuo reale corrisponde a discriminarlo da tutti gli altri individui del suo dominio. Questo significa, in altre parole, che entrambi assumono la tesi dell'indistinzione di semantica ed epistemologia. Solo una dottrina che condivida le tesi semantiche di Russell sugli indicali ma non presupponga il collassare di semantica ed epistemologia può far decadere del tutto l'argomento idealista.. (shrink)

In the course of his philosophical development, Jerry Fodor has indicated two sorts of non-broad (i.e., non-truthconditional) content of mental representations, namely content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) and narrow content (NC) qua mapping function from contexts (of thought) to broad contents. According to the former conceptualization, mental state tokens which are truth-conditionally identical may be such that they cannot both truthfully ascribed to one and the same subject at the same time, for they differ (...) in their respective DDC. In Fodor's own example, Oedipus' thoughts that he will marry Jocasta and that he will marry Mum are truth-conditionally identical, but different as far their DDC is concerned; one cannot indeed truthfully ascribe both thoughts to him simultaneously1. According to the latter conceptualization instead, mental state tokens of molecularly identical twins placed in different environments (such as Earth and Twin-Earth) are such that, although they differ in their truth-conditions, they share the same NC2. For instance, these twins respectively think that water quenches thirst and that twater (a liquid similar to water but its chemical composition) quenches thirst. Although these thoughts thus differ in broad content, they have the same NC: had the Twin-Earthling twin been brought up on Earth rather than on Twin-Earth where he actually lives, he would have thought that water quenches thirst rather than that twater quenches thirst3. According to Fodor's picture, both concepts are invoked for the purpose of psychology in order to account for one and the same thing, namely subjects' behavior. On the one hand, difference in behavior of a subject whose thought-tokens have the same truth-conditions may be ascribed to difference in the DDC of these tokens4. On the other hand, identity in behavior between two molecularly identical subjects whose thought-tokens have different truth-conditions is explained in terms of the NC- identity of these tokens5.. (shrink)